Link to Substack version of the piece: https://mtcapital.substack.com/p/why-gold

On January 21st of 2020, the CDC confirmed the first case of the novel 2019 coronavirus in the United States. Shortly thereafter, the WHO went on to officially declare Covid-19 a pandemic. What would follow would truly become an unprecedented time in human history. A world that prided itself on its hustle and bustle screeched to a halt, the imposition of isolation and social distancing became widespread, and industry came to a stand-still. At first, though as ludicrous as it seems now, the unknown nature of the pandemic and the many directions it could’ve taken instilled an uncertainty into day-to-day life.

Faced with the unpleasantness of unforeseeable outcomes, the resultant policy response was truly unique. In order to attempt to stifle out economic calamity, rates were quickly cut to zero, the Fed and other Central Banks engaged in massive purchases of securities, and fiscal stimulus seemed be endlessly abundant as governments around the world dropped helicopter money to all those that would take it. The degradation of the sanctity of money itself appeared to be unbounded as its supply expanded at truly unprecedented levels.

What would follow was to be expected. As liquidity sloshed around the system, as individuals cooped up at home consumed rapidly, and as semi locked-down economies spurred on supply side shocks galore, inflationary pressures eventually reared their ugly head. Though down from its peak, we now have persistent inflation that remains at levels that haven’t been seen in nearly forty years. The erosion of purchasing power continues to no avail.

In addition, the continued manipulation of markets is diminishing their ability to function in a healthy manner. Over the course of the last few decades, we have seen increasing levels of Central Bank intervention, a phenomenon that would disgust economists of the Austrian variety. Arguably, these happenings can be traced back to Alan Greenspan, the man that held the position of Fed Chair from 1987 to 2006. Throughout his tenure, the market became acquainted with the notion of the Fed put, a belief that markets had an embedded level of safety since the Fed tended to intervene when a downturn was underway. Intervention examples include 1987, when the Fed rapidly cut the Fed Funds Rate amidst a market crash in an attempt to cauterize the bleeding, strengthen the economy, and counter deflation, in 1998 when the Fed organized a group of 14 different banks and brokerage firms to invest billions in LTCM, an almost defunct hedge fund at the time whose imminent collapse posed a risk to the stability of Global Markets, and in the early 2000s when rates were rapidly cut in response to the pin-prick in the Tech Bubble that threatened to do some serious damage. Although Greenspan arguably gave birth to the Fed put, it didn’t fade into the void when his time at the Fed came to an end. Ben Bernanke, the later Fed Chair, leveraged a similar tool-kit as his predecessor during the Great Financial Crisis, cutting the FFR from the 5% range in 2006 all the way down to the low zero bound as economic turmoil spread. However, unlike typical instances of rapid rate cuts, their effect on the economy left much to be desired. Contraction continued to occur, and a new tool had to be employed as a result. Enter Quantitative Easing. In its simplest form, QE is a form of monetary policy where a Central Bank purchases securities from an open market in order to put continual downwards pressure on yields, and to stimulate the economy by way of the provision of liquidity. The use of QE started with QE1, where the Fed purchased large quantities of securities from December of 2008 to the beginning of 2010, continued with QE2 where weak employment and output spurred the Fed to purchase treasuries into the second half of 2011, occurred again with QE3 where billions in treasuries and MBS were purchased each month from September 2012 to October 2014, and crescendoed with QE4, when the pandemic spurred drastic responses. Not only is the Fed intervening in markets at a higher rate, but they continue to adopt new tools in order to achieve their aims as tactics of the past potentially loose their efficacy.

The byproduct of these happenings are evident. Valuations reached astronomical levels and arguably still remain elevated relative to history, the narrative of “there is no alternative”, driven by consistently negligible real yields, spurred exorbitant levels of risk taking across all asset classes, creating an everything bubble that continues to nastily deflate, and business models that would not survive outside of an environment with zero cost of capital somehow clung and continue to cling onto questionable existences.

With Central Banks essentially winging it with tools that have not gone through enough empirical testing for my liking, I find it unlikely that there is no long-term implications associated with their widespread application. I feel very uncomfortable holding any meaningful amount of cash when at the turn of a dime total money supply can increase by 30%+ in response to a crisis that has emerged. With the current over-financialization of the very world around us, and the tendency for Central Banks to continue their endless array of experimentation in order to pursue their agenda of “price stability”, I am concerned with the ability for markets to function properly.

With all of this in mind, gold helps assuage my fears. I find comfort in the fact that humans have assigned value to gold for thousands of years and will likely continue to do so for thousands more, that gold offers a certain degree of independence from economic and financial systems and is not subject to the erosion of its value as a result of Central Bank and Government policy, and that no matter the economic environment we find ourselves in, whether it be a secular decline, rebirth, boom, or prolonged period of stagnation, gold historically has been able to maintain its value. Although this may be viewed as an old-school take, I believe gold is valuable in a portfolio setting, and at the very least offers an attractive alternative to other assets commonly held as reserves that are much more subject to deterioration in both quality and sanctity over time.

Next week I will touch upon gold further & discuss a company that offers an attractive mechanism to gain exposure to the precious metal.

Until then,

MT Capital Research.

Substack-native post can be found here: https://mtcapital.substack.com/p/the-importance-of-asymmetry

In theory, the fundamental building blocks of the universe, matter and anti-matter, should exist at a 1:1 ratio, a positron for every electron, a yin to each yang. However, owed to some miraculous flaw in the simulation’s code, a perturbation in the motion of the universe’s marionette, this is not the case. Rather than the big-bang resulting in the almost immediate annihilation of matter and anti-matter into photons, matter prevailed, surviving in excess to its counterpart. Each grouping of matter, ranging from a tiny grain of sand, to the planets and their moons, is attributable to this glitch in the system. We owe our existence to asymmetry.

Asymmetry is not only beneficial to life itself, but to the art of portfolio construction as well. Some of the best types of exposures to have in investing are those with asymmetry; small bets made with these inherent characteristics can improve risk-adjusted returns over the long run, promote robustness, and enforce the foundations of anti-fragility.

Their usefulness is directly tied to the fundamental characteristics of their payoff function. Functions with larger gains than losses are what is known as non-linear convex. Negative outcomes associated with variable x cause small or relatively harmless amounts of pain, whereas outcomes on the positive end of the spectrum generate gains that are much larger in magnitude in comparison. In other words, these payoff functions have capped downside with largely uncapped upside.

Option traders commonly make use of these principles. Over the long run, participating in trades that loose a small amount of capital frequently, but generate large expected payouts during infrequent periods of heightened volatility or market turmoil, can counterintuitively improve the robustness of a portfolio.

In well-run businesses, similar types of behavior can be observed. Some companies devote a certain % of R&D each year to technological tinkering. Others may deploy a new product line in certain retail locations, pursue a sales & marketing strategy that is largely unexplored, or test their luck in a new geography. There is something to be said about devoting a small percentage of capital each year to new endeavours. Efforts such as these could very well lead to outcomes that were far from expected, and help to improve business quality over the long run.

The fact of the matter is, incorporating entities or instruments that embrace these principles into a portfolio arguably vastly improves one’s ability to expose themselves to events with positive upside potential. I can think of no better example of a company that continues to do just that than the King of the Gold Royalties Industry - Franco Nevada ( FNV 2.04%↑ ).

Franco Nevada was founded in 1983 by two individuals, Seymour Schulich and Pierre Lassonde, of whom had the intention to start a mining operation. Seymour began his career as an oil analyst at the Canadian Investment firm Beutel, Goodman & Company. As he earned his chops, he started to recognize the power of the royalty model that was commonly used throughout the oil and gas industry, particularly how these agreements generated phenomenal returns on capital. With this in the back of Seymour’s mind, and despite their desire to become a mining entity, in 1986 the two decided to purchase a gold royalty atop a small property in Nevada for around $2M, a location that was expected to yield approximately 500K ounces of precious metal. Shortly thereafter, the two started to benefit from asymmetry. Barrick Gold purchased the mine atop the property for $75M, and conducted additional exploration and deep-drilling. The expectation that 500K ounces of precious metal could be dug out of the ground quickly turned out to be an enormous underestimation of the site’s potential. Over the next few decades, north of 50M ounces of precious metal were able to obtained from this property. A $2M royalty investment has now generated more than $1B in revenue for Franco Nevada.

Over the last few decades, Franco Nevada has amassed a portfolio of hundreds of these instruments. Their payoff functions are uniquely asymmetric, and when analyzed in an extremely over-simplified manner arguably have three outcomes. The first (though unlikely) outcome is that the investment turns out to be an epic failure. Production doesn’t turn out as intended & the royalty has to be written off as a zero. The second more likely outcome is that the investment behaves as intended and Franco Nevada benefits from steady cash inflow as the assets continues to operate and produce. The third outcome is expectations are exceeded, such as scenarios where additional and unintended production capacity is brought online, an unknown reserve is stumbled upon, etc. I can think of no better portfolio company that offers such clear exposure to positive, asymmetric outcomes. My next in-depth research report will go much deeper into the company’s financials, prospects, and why I believe this is the best way to get exposure to gold in an equity-centric portfolio.

Until next time,

MT Capital Research.

My latest substack piece can be found below! https://mtcapital.substack.com/p/why-dont-we-ever-learn

Humankind has made irrefutable technological process during our short tenure on this planet. We have manipulated the elements around us to propel ourselves to the top of the food chain, bringing with it a comfort of life and a plethora of capabilities that would’ve been thought impossible to our forebears. Despite this ingenuity, human nature has changed very little. Our biological makeup is nearly identical to those that traversed the earth before us. Our behaviour patterns, though disguised in niceties and etiquette, still draw from animalistic tendencies. We’re still plagued by the compulsiveness, greed and naivety that has gripped members of species since the beginning of time. Human nature really hasn’t changed.

We have all heard the aphorism that if we fail to study history, we are doomed to repeat it, and this holds even more true today. As our world is ravaged by war, as financial market participants are duped by fraud, as the stories with the same plot repeat themselves with an almost uncomfortable frequency, one has to wonder - do we ever learn?

I don’t have the answer to that question, nor will I try to pretend like I do. However, during my time trying to understand and participate in financial markets, I can’t help but notice how frequently large-scale frauds seem to occur.

Take ponzi schemes as an example, these heinous financial entities perpetrated by downright evil actors have victimized thousands of individuals across hundreds of years. Many would trace back their origins to Charles Ponzi, a man that defrauded an abundance of investors with promises of being able to generate 50% returns in 45 days. However, despite the importance of these events, and the name of the schemes since being attached to this bad actor’s name, there are actually earlier occurrences, ones that can be traced all the way back to the 1800s.

Arguably the earliest documented case of a ponzi was in Bavaria in the late 1800s. Our villain in this story is Adele Spitzeder, a German woman that turned to financial crime after retiring from a semi-successful career as an actress in the 1860s.

Accustomed to living a fairly luxurious lifestyle, when her income from her previous occupation approached the zero bound, she embraced the art of the grift rather than trying to cut expenses. Similar to Ponzi, Spitzeder devised a plan - concocting a recipe for an investment opportunity that promised to pay an unrealistic but enticing 10% per month. At the end of 1869, Spitzeder found her first victim, webbing her in with tales of spectacular potential riches. Enticed by her charm, this working class woman decided to invest, handing over 100 gulden to Spitzeder. Ruin was not instantly met. A short time later, the investor received 20 gulden back from Spitzeder, with the promise to receive a further 110 gulden three months down the line. As you might imagine, tales of spectacular and expedient profits rapidly spread, and Spitzeder quickly received investments from hundreds of people, mainly members of lower income classes who did not know any better. This demand was almost downright insatiable and soon, out of necessity, Spitzeder decided to open a bank in order to keep the scheme afloat - Dachauer Bank was formed. Like other entities set up to help sustain a fraud, their operations were all a front. Accounting procedures were minimal, and the deposits of incoming investors were stashed under floorboards, hidden in cupboards, and stored in other manners that were not befitting of a well-run financial institution.

Even despite operating in a manner that would give any auditor a heart attack, growth continued. The bank started to employ hundreds of contractors to keep the day-to-day running smoothly, was speculating heavily on real estate purchases, and was drawing an abundance of deposits away from Bavaria’s legitimate banking operations due to the high interest it offered (despite stealing customer principal). Withdrawals from legitimate banking operations to Dachauer bank eventually became such a problem that government officials took notice. The Minster for Upper Bavaria started to note the unusually high withdrawals that were being made from neighbouring banks, and became concerned with both the legitimacy of Dachauer Bank’s operations and how they were able to offer such enticing returns, as well how these happenings could potentially cause ripple effects through the rest of the economy.

Fearing economic calamity, government entities quickly worked to steer the ship right. The Interior Ministry placed ads in newspapers, warning customers not to invest, and the Munich police denounced the bank’s fundamental soundness - actions that added more fuel to the fire as investors deemed this a coordinated effort to deter working class individuals away from fantastic investing opportunities.

It didn’t help that Spitzeder’s philanthropic endeavours were widely cherished. Though financed with stolen money, she had opened nearly 12 soup kitchens, actions that not only elevated her in the public sphere, but also in the eye of the media. Coupled with the fact that she had also extended enormous loans to a plethora of newspapers, she was able to largely control the narrative.

Despite all of this, the hunches of competitors and government officials, coupled with the organized efforts of the courts to synchronize an enormous withdrawal of depositor funds, eventually lead to the bank’s demise. In 1872, after a group of 760 individuals demanded large sums of their money back, Dachauer Bank went under, unable to meet withdrawal requests with cash they had on hand. Shortly thereafter, the true nature of the bank’s operations were uncovered, and Spitzeder was sentenced to a measly 4 years in prison (by exploiting loopholes in the Bavarian legal system) for running one of the biggest frauds in history at the time, swindling an estimated €430M euros in today’s money away from investors.

Flash forward more than 130 years, despite undeniable progress made by our species in almost every field, a similar situation happened. Madoff likely needs no introduction. The man is getting a lot of resurgent attention of late due to the newly released Netflix docuseries, and for good reason, he perpetrated one of the largest frauds of our generation, one that infiltrated financial infrastructure to the very core, and showcased how fragile, poorly operated, and ripe for exploitation our systems are.

Madoff essentially operated in two spheres - one legitimate and one displaying all of the hallmark traits of a typical ponzi scheme. His brokerage firm on the legitimate side of things was rather impressive - technology that was created in-house was responsible for early foundations of the Nasdaq , and by the late 90s the man was processing close to 20% of the trading orders on the New York Stock Exchange. This prowess brought with it admiration and respect - Madoff operated in commendable circles, sitting as a chairman of the National Association of Securities Dealers, swaying regulatory direction with his interactions with the SEC, and more. In addition, similar to our predecessor outlined earlier, Madoff was known for his philanthropic side and sway outside of finance, existing as a major contributor to a plethora of charities and to the Democratic party of the United States. On the illicit side of things, Madoff wasn’t so rosy. Madoff Investment Securities also operated an illegal quasi-hedge fund/advisory business, one that leveraged ponzinomics to its benefit. The scheme was relatively straightforward. Madoff collected funds from clients with the promise of steady profits, displaying past results that showcased consistent performance to draw them in, often marketing a fake option “collar” investment strategy to the more inquisitive potential investors.

These claims were of course malarky. What Madoff was instead doing was depositing inbound client funds to a Chase Manhattan Bank account, paying out “returns” to early investors by using the money obtained from later investors. Though simple on paper, Madoff employed a host of individuals to spin a false web of sophistication around these happenings, with some employees spending hours a day fabricating documentation that outlined the firm’s fake trades. In reality however, the fund relied on a constant inflow of capital to keep the operations going. Old investors could be paid out consistently as long as new investors kept coming in. However, when the GFC hit and the music stopped playing, trouble emerged. In 2008, when the redemption requests started to hit, Madoff Investment Securities was unable to cover these withdrawals with the cash they had on hand. The scheme was then unearthed, Madoff was arrested and was sentenced to 150 years in prison for his actions. Madoff would later die of natural causes in prison last year.

Take Sam Bankman-Fried as another example. Although FTX was arguably not operating an identical scheme to Spitzeder and Madoff, his ascent shares many similarities. The since disgraced cryptocurrency figure started Alameda Research in 2017, a crypto hedge fund that rose to fame as a result of its supposed exploitation of the “kimchi trade” opportunity. In essence, due to the restrictive nature of the South Korean Won and Japanese Yen currencies, crypto that traded on exchanges housed in these geographical areas traded at a slight premium in comparison to other parts of the world. Traders could exploit this arbitrage opportunity by purchasing crypto in other areas, and sell it on South Korean or Japanese exchanges to capture the spread. Alameda Research supposedly just did that, garnering massive amounts of profits and growing their AUM spectacularly in the process.

This newfound scale, in conjunction with the relatively underdeveloped nature of cryptocurrency infrastructure at the time, spurred SBF to pursue another venture simultaneously - the creation of a cryptocurrency exchange FTX. The endeavour made sense on paper, you had a trading firm on the left that wanted their trades to be executed in a better manner, so why not create a cryptocurrency exchange on the right that was capable of doing just that? The supposed technical prowess of the newly formed entity made its way into the mainstream crypto sphere, and the geeky nature of Sam quickly fooled investors into he was the next misunderstood tech genius that would bring with him swaths of riches. Venture capitalists, pension funds and other supposedly sophisticated investors participated in the nearly $1.8B in funding that FTX was able to obtain over the course of its short lifetime. With central-bank induced liquidity spurring on the most irrational of exuberances across markets, the FTX valuation soared in conjunction with the lofty ambitions for the cryptocurrency ecosystem as a whole, reaching almost $40B at its peak. Hoards of cryptocurrency hedge funds, cryptocurrency enthusiasts, and mom and pop investors deposited their assets on the platform, a value that reportedly reached approximately $16B at its peak. SBF started to become revered by mainstream media. His philanthropic endeavours resulted in many stating SBF was going to change the world. Even after the monumental scandal was uncovered, the Wall Street Journal still had the audacity to tout how fraud ruined the man’s plans to save Planet Earth:

In addition, SBF was also consistently lobbying with politicians to bring regulation to the crypto space, and was the second largest contributor to the democratic party ahead of their most recent election, next to the legendary George Soros.

Monumental ascent aside, the descent was even more spectacular. Giving WeWork a run for its money, the evisceration of valuation and capital was truly astounding. Spurred on by a piece created by Coindesk that speculated that FTX’s balance sheet wasn’t as solvent as some might believe, as well a social media storm created by Binance outlining that they were selling their holdings of FTX’s native token, a bank-run-esque situation came into fruition.

In essence, these happenings outlined the fact that a key component of FTX’s balance sheet was made up of their native tokens, FTT. Put simply, the company created, out of thin air (using code), “assets” that were at their core inherently worthless, but after being touted to the masses during FTX’s phenomenal rise, saw an equally remarkable trajectory upwards. Marking these tokens to market allowed for FTX’s asset position to be bolstered significantly, which on the surface may have resulted in the company appearing solvent when in reality this was far from the case.

Spurred on by the aforementioned media frenzy that occurred in the latter half of last year, investors started to run for the doors. Similarly to other financial schemes, once it was found out that the company did not have the sufficient assets to pay back their customers, they quickly went under. Shortly thereafter, FTX was arrested in the Bahamas and is now on trial, the outcome of which will be very interesting to monitor going forward.

Spurred on by the aforementioned media frenzy that occurred in the latter half of last year, investors started to run for the doors. Similarly to other financial schemes, once it was found out that the company did not have the sufficient assets to pay back their customers, they quickly went under. Shortly thereafter, FTX was arrested in the Bahamas and is now on trial, the outcome of which will be very interesting to monitor going forward.

Frauds like these are bound to continue to occur. Investors would be best served to extensively research any and all investment opportunities they participate in, and remember that if something sounds too good to be true, it almost always is. Although focus on the present moment is undoubtedly important, the study of history ensures we are not duped by the same tactics of the past.

“Of all Elixirs, Gold is supreme and the most important for us. Gold can keep the body indestructible. Drinkable gold will cure all illnesses, it renews and restores.” - Paracelsus

Chemistry has a medieval ancestor known as alchemy, a field of study that pushed forward the scientific field quite substantially in between the middle ages and the 17th century. One of alchemy’s most sought after endeavours was the obtainment of the philosopher’s stone, a substance that alchemists believed would be able to turn base metals into precious ones, particularly gold and silver. In addition, alchemists believed that the philosopher’s stone contained physical properties, commonly known as the elixir of life, conferring longevity, bodily rejuvenation, and potential immortality to anyone that drank it.

Although the scientific legitimacy of this pursuit has been debunked (not writing it off entirely, our species is full of innovative creatures), it does highlight something engrained within the human condition, what I will denote as the “something from nothing” phenomenon. Within markets, individuals are often attracted to the loudest voices, buying into endeavours that are often too good to be true. Past frauds from the likes of Charles Ponzi to Bernie Madoff gripped the masses, fooling individuals that were intelligent on paper with promises of phenomenal returns across all time-frames. Even recently, the recent FTX debacle highlights the degree at which even the most supposedly sophisticated of investors (Sequoia, Ontario Teacher’s Pension Plan, etc.) were gripped by promises of riches, forgoing due diligence and succumbing to FOMO. In short, much like the philosopher’s stone, we all want to turn nothing into something. We are all enticed by the promise of being able to turn the invaluable into gold.

Being that as it may, sometimes someone does find a way to create immense value out of things that others would scoff off entirely. Copart is one of those instances. Copart turns junk into gold.

In the US alone, the last five decades has seen the moving 12-month total of vehicle miles traveled more than double from approximately 1,292,257 millions of miles at the beginning of 1975, to approximately 2,873,804 miles at the beginning of 2022. Intuitively, this makes sense. With steady population growth and consistent rates at which individuals direct expenditures at obtaining and maintaining the right to operate a motor vehicle, it is only natural that the total amount of miles traveled increases over time, especially as the desire to remain mobile remains ingrained in our cultures. With an increase in miles driven, a steady rate of accidents has also occurred. Per IIHS data, the crash rate per millions of miles traveled has plateaued over the last few years in the low one percent range, a phenomenon that is likely to remain consistent given human nature and the recklessness that is embedded therein, even despite the safety improvements that have been made with vehicles over the last couple of decades:

Copart’s business is tied directly to these car wrecks. In order to understand why exactly this is the case, we have to start breaking down each component of Copart’s business separately. Let's start from the ground up, literally. As of their most recent annual conference call, the company has approximately 16,000 acres of land, of which house thousands of salvage yard facilities:

Therein, the salvage yards contain rows upon rows of vehicles, of which the two key parties of the Copart business model, the buyers and the sellers, would like to interact with in some way shape or form, either to get a vehicle off of or on their hands. Vehicle sellers are primarily insurance companies, but also include the likes of banks, fleet operators, rental companies, individuals, etc. Vehicle buyers on the other hand are primarily vehicle dismantlers, used vehicle dealers, exporters, and again, individuals.

Let’s use a typical accident as an illustrative example to see how one can interact with the yards themselves. When a car accident occurs, damage to the car may range from a minor scratch to the more severe, and one will typically wonder if their insurance will be able to cover the repairs, or if they will even deem it worthwhile to do so in the first place. After the damaged car has been transported to a temporary storage facility, the insurance company will enlist the services of a claim adjuster in order to assess the vehicle. The claim adjuster will determine the actual cash value (commonly known as the pre-accident value outside of Canada) of the vehicle, which is essentially the replacement value of the vehicle less any accumulated depreciation. If the sum of the cost to repair the vehicle, the vehicle’s salvage value, and the cost to provide the driver with an interim means of transportation is more than the actual cash value, the vehicle will be deemed a “total loss”. If the opposite is true, and the aforementioned total is less than the actual cash value, the insurance company will usually decide to go forward with the vehicle repairs. Copart becomes involved with the process if the car is deemed a total loss. Once this is the case, the vehicle will then be towed from the temporary storage facility to a salvage yard. Thereafter, the insurance company (the seller in this case) will await the vehicle to go through the process of being sold at auction and have its title transferred (usually the longest part of the process depending on how expedient the DMV is, can be expected to take ~30-45 days). Upon completion, they will settle with the insured individual.

In the United States and Canada, and occasionally in other International Markets, the company will operate as an agent, providing remarketing services and selling salvage vehicles on behalf of the insurance companies (or other sellers) on a consignment basis. As alluded to earlier, this is not always the case in international markets. Sometimes Copart acts as both a principal and an agent. In the UK, since insurance companies there are less likely to want to take on auction price risk, Copart will act as a principal and purchase the salvage vehicles outright, reselling the vehicles directly from their balance sheet. As an additional example, in markets such as Germany, vehicles are often listed on behalf of insurance companies, whereby the insurance companies will leverage the platform to payout the insured the actual cash value less the highest bid. The insured, upon receiving the payout from the insurance company, will then have the option to accept the highest bid, or the bid of another third party received within a few weeks of the original auction.

My latest deep-dive on $ASML: https://mtcapital.substack.com/p/asml

My latest piece on $NVDA after their most recent Q3 earnings: https://mtcapital.substack.com/p/nvidia-nvda-e58

My thoughts on the most recent $AMD quarter. Like any highly sought after commodity, semiconductors and associated companies have wilted as a result of cyclicality. However, the growth trajectory of $AMD is far from dead: https://mtcapital.substack.com/p/advanced-micro-devices-amd-91c

My latest deep-dive on $DOLE is out now. https://mtcapital.substack.com/p/dole

My latest piece of research on $META can be found below: https://mtcapital.substack.com/p/meta

Any good writeups on Hermes? $RMS